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DAY, EVANGELINOS, AND MARTINEZ HERNANDEZ:
EMBARKING ON AN INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 17
OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
On August 5, 1973, at the Hellenikon Airport in Athens, Greece,
two armed Arab terrorists commenced a violent attack upon passengers
awaiting a weapons search before boarding Trans World Airlines
(TWA) flight 881 bound for New York. The terrorists threw three hand
grenades and randomly fired gunshots into the vicinity of the passen-
gers. The attackers then took thirty-two people as hostages. After two
hours of tense negotiations with officials, the terrorists surrendered and
were arrested. As a result of the attack, five people were killed and
more than forty others were injured.'
Several of the injured passengers brought suit against TWA in
Pennsylvania and New York federal courts to recover damages for
personal injuries sustained during the attack. 2 Plaintiffs alleged liabil-
ity without fault, under the Warsaw Convention3 as supplemented by
the Montreal Agreement. These cases of first impression involved the
1. The two terrorists arrested in connection with the attack, Shafik Ed Arid and
Talaat Khantouran, both twenty-one years of age and born in Jordan, were convicted of
murder and sentenced to death in the Greek Criminal Court on January 24, 1974. The
death sentence of the two terrorists was commuted by the Greek Supreme Court, and
they were deported to Libya on May 7, 1974. Brief for Appellants (Appendix) at 123a-
24a, Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977).
2. In Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd,
528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890, reh. denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1976),
plaintiff Kersen sought recovery for her personal injuries, mental anguish and for the
wrongful death of her husband which occurred as a result of the attack. In Day, three
actions were consolidated with a total of ten plaintiffs seeking recovery. In Evangelinos
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, No. 75-1990 (3d
Cir., filed May 4, 1976), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977), the
plaintiffs were a mother and her four children.
Other actions arising out of the same incident include: Arapogiannis v. TWA, Civil
No. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Hadzis v. TWA, Civil No. 4010 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Koutsovitis
v. TWA, Civil No. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Leppo v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No.
21770-1973 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., March 10, 1976); Linardos v. TWA, No. C 78565 (Super. Ct.
Cal. 1974); Maropis v. TWA, Civil No. 4297 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Several cases were settled
out of court. Several other cases in the Supreme Court of New York County resulted in
summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the issue of absolute liability under the Warsaw
Convention and Montreal Agreement.
3. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, done at Warsaw, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876
[hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention].
. 4. The Montreal Agreement is composed of four documents: 1) an agreement,
C.A.B. Agreement No. 18900 (signed by each airline, including Trans World Airlines,
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crucial question of whether the plaintiffs were "in the course of any of
the operations of embarking" as delineated in article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention.' Two circuit courts recently concluded, as a matter of
law, that the plaintiffs were in the course of "operations of embark-
ing." In the first decision, Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. ,6 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed a decision of
the Southern District Court of New York. In the second decision,
Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. ,7 a six to three majority of
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc, with a vigorous
dissent by Chief Judge Seitz, reversed the holding of the Western
District Court of Pennsylvania.
After the Day and Evangelinos cases were decided, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals decided Martinez Hernandez v. Air France,8
a case arising out of a terrorist attack which occurred on May 20, 1972,
in the baggage retrieval area of the Lod International Airport located
near Tel Aviv, Israel. In Martinez Hernandez, the plaintiffs claimed
that they were "disembarking" within the meaning of article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention as supplemented by the Montreal Agreement, and
therefore sought to hold Air France absolutely liable for personal
injuries and deaths caused by the terrorist attack. In affirming the
Puerto Rican District Court's dismissal of the complaint, the First
Circuit Court found that the plaintiffs were not in the course of
disembarking. In so finding, the court reached a decision that is at
variance with the fundamental premises of the Day and Evangelinos
rulings.
This note will analyze the interpretations of article 17 given by the
courts in Day, Evangelinos, and Martinez Hernandez. This analysis
will include a brief discussion of the Warsaw Convention and the
Montreal Agreement, and an examination of the three cases followed
by a critical evaluation of the elements used by the courts to construe
the meaning of the phrase "in the course of any operations of embark-
Inc.); 2) a tariff; 3) a Notice to Passengers; and 4) the order of the C.A.B. approving the
tariffs, C.A.B. Order No. E 23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Montreal Agreement]. Although the agreement does not have the effect of a treaty, it
"imposets] upon international aviation a quasi-legal and largely experimental system of
liability, that is essentially contractual in nature." For the texts and a list of signatories,
see I L. KREINDLER, AVIATION AccIDENT LAW § 12 A.03-.06 (1971 ed.).
5. 49 Stat. 3018. See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
6. 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890, reh. denied, 429 U.S.
1124 (1976), aff'g 393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
7. 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977), rev'g 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
8. 545 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3652 (Mar. 29, 1977),
aff'g In re Tel Aviv, 405 F. Supp. 154 (D.P.R. 1975).
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ing or disembarking." In concluding, this note will propose a suggest-
ed approach for judicial analysis of the scope of article 17.
I. THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND THE
MONTREAL AGREEMENT
In Day, Evangelinos, and Martinez Hernandez, the plaintiffs
based their claims for recovery upon the theory that the defendant
airline was absolutely liable under the Warsaw Convention as supple-
mented by the Montreal Agreement. 9 The Warsaw Convention, pro-
mulgated in 1929, is an international treaty that governs the substan-
tive rights and obligations of passengers and airlines in international air
travel. '0 It is by far the most widely adopted treaty concerning private
international law, and one of the most widely adopted of all treaties. "
The primary objectives of the Warsaw Convention were to pro-
vide a regime of law which would give stability and uniformity to an
infant international air transport industry.' 2 To this end, the Conven-
9. In both Day and Evangelinos, plaintiffs also based their suit on negligence.
Since the Athens airport was controlled and owned by the Greek government, and not by
TWA, there appears little factual basis for such theories. See Day v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217, 218 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Although the plaintiffs
procedurally could have sued the terrorists, in all likelihood, they would have been
"judgment proof" defendants. See Ambrahmovsky, Compensation for Passengers of
Hijacked Aircraft, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 339, 342 (1972).
10. The Warsaw Convention applies to "all international transportation of persons
. . . performed by aircraft for hire." Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 1(1).
Article 1(2) defines international transportation as:
[Any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties,
the place of departure and the place of destination . . . are situated either
within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of
a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a
territory subject to the sovereignty . . . of another Power, even though that
Power is not a party to this Convention.
In Day and Evangelinos, the subject flight was international transportation within
the purview of the Treaty because the plaintiffs were passengers scheduled to board the
aircraft departing from Athens and arriving in New York City.
11. A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW, Ch. VI § 4.1 at 88 (1972). For a list of parties to
the Warsaw Convention see TREATIES IN FORCE 302 (1974). Debated and drafted in the
French language, the Warsaw Convention was signed by the representatives of twenty-
three countries at Warsaw, Poland, on October 12, 1929. Adherence was advised by the
United States Senate on June 15, 1934, and proclaimed by President Roosevelt on
October 29, 1934. Greece ratified the Convention on January 11, 1938. D. BILLYOU, AIR
LAW 592 (2d ed. 1964). For a discussion of the legality of the United States ratification
and the constitutionality of the Convention's venue and damage limitations, see Haskell,
The Warsaw System and the U.S. Constitution Revisited, 39 J. AIR L. & CoM. 483
(1973).
12. Boyle, The Guatemala Protocol, 6 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 41, 41 (1976). The
preamble of the Warsaw Convention states that its purpose is to regulate "in a uniform
manner the conditions of international transportation by air in respect of the documents
3
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tion established uniform rules regulating air transportation documents,
procedural rules governing the time and place for filing damage
claims, and the basis for and limits of air carriers' liability.' 3 Article 17
of the Treaty provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event
of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily
injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused
the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or
in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disem-
barking.' 4
The liability imposed upon the carrier by article 17 is excused
under article 20(1) of the Convention if the airline were to prove that it
had taken "all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was
impossible for [it] to take such measures."
' 5
Article 22 of the Convention provides that the carrier's liability
for death or injury to passengers is limited to approximately $8,300 per
passenger.' 6 After many years of dissatisfaction with this low limit of
liability, ' 7 the United States filed formal notice of denunciation 8 of the
Warsaw Convention on November 15, 1965, to take effect six months
later.' 9 One day prior to the effective date of termination, the United
used for such transportation and of the liability of the carrier." Warsaw Convention,
supra note 3. See Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 387 F.2d 323, 327 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW Ch. VI § 2.1 at
27 (1972).
13. Boyle, The Guatemala Protocol, 6 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 41, 41 (1976).
14. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, at 3018 (emphasis added). The official
version, which was in French, of article 17 reads as follows:
Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu en cas de mort, de
blessure ou de toute autre 16sion corporelle subie par un voyageur lorsque
]'accident qui a caus6 le dommage s'est produit A bord de I'aironef ou au cours
de toutes opirations d'embarquement et de dibarquement.
Id. at 3005 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 3019.
16. Id. Liability was limited to 125,000 Poincar6 gold francs. Recent devaluations
have increased the limit to $10,000. See Comment, Legal Problems in Compensation
Under the Gold Clauses of Private International Law Agreements, 63 GEO. L.J. 817
(1975). The Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement liability limitations apply only
to airlines. Manufacturers, airports, and other potential defendants are not similarly
insulated.
17. For a discussion of the history leading up to and the reasons for the Montreal
Agreement, see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Conven-
tion, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfeld & Mendelsohnl;
Symposium on the Warsaw Convention, 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 519 (1967); Comment, The
Warsaw Convention-Recent Developments and the Withdrawal of the United States
Denunciation, 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 243 (1966).
18. Any party may withdraw under article 39. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, at
3022.
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States withdrew2" its notice of denunciation as a result of numerous
meetings with the air carriers of the International Air Transport Associ-
ation and with various governments. Those meetings resulted in the
Montreal Agreement which raised the limitation of liability to
$75,000, including legal fees, or $58,000, exclusive of legal fees. 2 1 In
addition, under the Montreal Agreement, the airlines waived any
defense it might have had under article 20(1) of the Convention. 22 As a
result, the air carriers are now exposed to liability without fault,
provided the flight be international in scope and include a stop within
the United States.23 The Montreal Agreement, however, did not
change in any way the text of article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.24
II. THE DECISIONS IN DAY AND EVANGELINOS
A. Boarding Procedure in Athens
When determining the scope of article 17, courts have placed
great emphasis upon the activities and location of the passengers when
injured, as well as the airline's control of the passengers. In the
incident at Hellenikon Airport on August 5, 1973, the passengers for
flight 881, upon entering the terminal, proceeded to the check-in
counter where they presented their tickets, 25 deposited their luggage,
and paid the departure tax. After being given a boarding pass and
20. 54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 955 (1966).
21. C.A.B. Order No. E 23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966). The Warsaw Convention
was earlier amended by the Protocol signed at the Hague in 1955. Protocol to Amend the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air
Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, done at the Hague Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S.
371. Subject to certain provisions, the Protocol provides for liability limitations of
approximately $16,600 per passenger. Although the Hague Protocol is in effect in over
forty-five nations, it has never been ratified by the United States. For information about
the Hague Protocol, see Beaumont, The Warsaw Convention of 1929, as Amended by the
Protocol Signed at the Hague, on September 28, 1955, 22 J. AIR L. & COM. 414 (1955);
Calkins, Grand Canyon, Warsaw and the Hague Protocol, 23 J. AIR L. & CoM. 253
(1956).
22. Although the airlines cannot defend by a showing of their own due care, a
passenger's contributory negligence may be raised as a defense under article 21. Warsaw
Convention, supra note 3, at 3019.
23. The "stop" within the United States includes a ticketed "point of origin, point
of destination, or agreed stopping place." C.A.B. Order No. E 23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302
(1966).
24. Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
25. The tickets contained the "Advice to International Passengers on Limitation of
Liability" and the "Notice" which read in pertinent part as follows:
If the passenger's journey involves an ultimate destination or stop in a country
other than the country of departure the Warsaw Convention may be applicable
and the Convention governs and in most cases limits the liability of carriers for
death or personal injury . ...
Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95, 97 n.6 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
5
Hendlin: Day, Evangelinos, And Martinez Hernandez: Embarking on an Interpr
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1977
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
baggage check, the passengers walked through Greek passport and
currency control and descended a flight of stairs into the transit lounge.
The lounge was restricted to airline personnel and passengers waiting
to depart on international flights. After securing a seat assignment at
the transfer desk located inside the lounge, the travelers waited for
their flight to be called. When the flight was announced, they pro-
ceeded to the designated departure gate where the Greek police con-
ducted a search of hand luggage and passengers. Had the terrorist
attack not occurred, the passengers then would have walked through
the doors of the terminal building and boarded a bus which would have
transported them approximately 250 meters to the airplane.
The passengers of TWA flight 881 were attacked while standing
in line at the departure gate to which they had been summoned by a
TWA representative. After seven of the eighty-nine scheduled passen-
gers had been searched, the terrorists began their assault.26
B. The Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., Decision
In Day27 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the hold-
ing of District Court Judge Brieant who granted to the plaintiffs a
summary judgment on the issue of absolute liability. In its defense,
TWA contended that the application of article 17 should be determined
only by reference to the particular location of the accident. Basing its
argument upon the legislative history of the Warsaw Convention,
subsequent statements by delegates to the Convention, writings of air
scholars, and foreign and United States judicial decisions, TWA as-
serted that the carrier's liability under the Convention should not attach
while the passenger is inside the terminal building. The Circuit Court
rejected this contention and agreed with the analysis of Judge Brieant,
who had stated that "the issue . . . is not where [the plaintiff's] feet
were planted when the killing began, but rather, in what activity was
he engaged.' 28 The Second Circuit Court was of the opinion that:
26. In statements made to the police, the terrorists admitted that they had planned
to attack Israel bound immigrant passengers on TWA flights going to Tel Aviv, but
mistakenly struck the passengers boarding the New York bound flight. They acknowl-
edged membership in the Black September terrorist organization and that they were
seeking international publicity.
Flight 881 eventually departed for New York carrying only the seven passengers
who had actually completed clearance before the attack. Day v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
27. 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1976), affg 393 F. Supp.
217 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
28. 393 F. Supp. 217, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (emphasis added).
Vol. 7
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[T]he words "in the course of any of the operations of
embarking" do not exclude events transpiring within a ter-
minal building. Nor, do these words set forth any strictures
on location. Rather, the drafters of the Convention look to
whether the passenger's actions were a part of the operation
or process of embarkation, as did Judge Brieant.29
The court summed up its position by concluding:
Whether one looks to the passengers' activity (which was a
condition to embarkation), to the restriction of their move-
ments, to the imminence of boarding, or even to their posi-
tion adjacent to the terminal gate, we are driven to the
conclusion that the plaintiffs were "in the course of em-
barking."30
In support of its conclusion, the Second Circuit Court advanced
three policy arguments in favor of extending protection to the victims
of the Athens attack. The court indicated that a broad construction of
article 17 would be in harmony with modern theories of accident cost
allocation. 3 1 It reasoned that the airlines were in a better position than
passengers to bear the costs of accidents by distributing such costs
among all passengers. 32 The court further considered that its interpreta-
tion would encourage "the goal of accident prevention" because the
airlines are best able to persuade, pressure or compensate airport
managers to adopt more stringent security measures to guard against
terrorist attacks. 33 If necessary, the airlines could hire more of their
own security guards. Finally, the court stated that the administrative
costs of allowing recovery under the absolute liability system em-
bodied in the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agreement were
significantly lower than available alternatives.,34 It reasoned that if
article 17 were not applicable, the passengers' only possibility of
recovery would be to maintain a complex, costly and time consuming
suit in a foreign forum against the operator of the airport.
35
Although the defendants asserted that the minutes of the Warsaw
Convention indicate a desire by the delegates to implement a rule
29. 529 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted, emphasis in original).
30. Id. at 33-34 (footnote omitted).
31. Id. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 34-45 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as CALABRESI].
32. Id. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 17, at 599-600. See text accom-
panying notes 136-38 infra.
33. Id.
34. Id. See CALABRESI, supra note 31, at 150-52.
35. Id. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 17, at 600; Rosenberg & Sovern,
Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation, 59 COLUM. L. REV." 1115 (1959).
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based solely on location, the Day court believed the delegates pre-
ferred to "provide latitude for the courts to consider the factual setting
of each case." 36 The court noted that while courts should "strive to
'give the specific words of a treaty a meaning consistent with the
genuine shared expectations of the contracting parties,'" those expec-
tations can change over a period of time. 37 With the observation that
the Montreal Agreement provides "decisive evidence of the goals and
expectations currently shared by the parties to the Warsaw Conven-
tion," 38 the court determined that "protection of the passenger ranks
high among the goals which the Warsaw signatories now look to the
Convention to serve.' 39
Finally, the Day court reasoned that the drafters of the Warsaw
Convention "wished to create a system of liability rules that would
cover all the hazards of air travel. "40 The court believed that while
risks once were limited to aerial disasters, they now include such perils
as a terrorist attack inside an airline terminal. Therefore, the court
concluded that the rigid location-based rule espoused by TWA would
"ill serve" the goal of the Warsaw delegates since it would exclude
"many claims relating to liability for the hazards of flying." 41
C. The Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., Decision
Several months after the Southern District Court of New York in
Day ruled that the Athens passengers were embarking, Judge Snyder
of the Western District Court of Pennsylvania reached an opposite
conclusion in Evangelinos,42 a virtually identical case arising from the
same event. Relying upon the legislative history of article 17, subse-
quent commentary on the Convention and cases involving disembark-
ing, the district court in Evangelinos believed that "the delegates were
defining geographical limits rather than an activity when they used the
words, 'any operations of embarkation'." 43 Opting for a location-
based test, the court found that accidents that occur within the air
terminal are beyond the scope of article 17.44 The Evangelinos district
36. 528 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1975).
37. Id. quoting Maximov v. United States, 299 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd,
373 U.S. 49 (1963).
38. Id. at 36.
39. Id. at 37 (footnote omitted),
40. Id. at 38.
41. Id.
42. 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
43. Id. at 101. For a discussion concurring with the Evangelinos lower court, see
Comment, Embarking and Disembarking: The Parameters of the Warsaw Convention, 9
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 251, 268-69 (1976).
44. 3% F. Supp. 95, 102 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
Vol. 7
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court believed that the court in Day had extended the liability of the
signatories to the Warsaw Convention "far beyond anything that was
within the contemplation of the parties."
45
After the Second Circuit Court affirmed the lower court in Day,
the majority of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc,
reversed 46 the decision of the district court in Evangelinos and, for
"substantially the same reasons as expressed in Day,'' 47 found the
plaintiffs to be in the course of the operations of embarking. Chief
Judge Seitz, however, in a lengthy and vigorous dissenting opinion,
stated that he would have affirmed the lower court's ruling and granted
TWA's motion to dismiss the claim.
Giving article 17 a "common sense construction, ''48 the
Evangelinos majority, in an opinion authored by Judge Van Dusen,
examined the nature of the activity in which the plaintiffs were en-
gaged to determine if such activity could fairly be considered part of
"the operations of embarking." With particular emphasis on the
activity in which the plaintiffs were involved, the control by TWA
over the plaintiffs at the time of the accident and the relation of the
terrorist attack to air travel, the court believed it was "appropriate
under all the facts and circumstances of this case to view the activity of
undergoing pre-boarding searches as part of the 'operations of em-
barking'.
The majority observed that the plaintiffs' injuries were sustained
"while they were acting at the explicit direction of TWA and while
they were performing the final act required as a prerequisite to board-
ing busses" 50 employed by TWA to take the plaintiffs to the aircraft.
The court placed significance on the fact that at the time these opera-
tions had commenced, the flight had already been called for final
boarding. Therefore, the passengers were "no longer mingling over a
broad area with passengers of other airlines," but were "congregated
in a specific geographical area designated by TWA and were identifi-
able as a group associated with TWA's Flight 881."11 The court found
that:
By announcing the flight, forming the group and directing the
passengers as a group to stand near the departure gate, TWA
45. Id.
46. 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977), rev'g 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
47. 550 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1977).
48. Id. at 155.
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had assumed control over the group . . . .Under these
circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that TWA had
begun to perform its obligation as air carrier under the con-
tract of carriage and that TWA . . . had assumed responsi-
bility for the plaintiffs' protection. Thus, for all practical
purposes, "the operations of embarking" had begun. 2
Refusing to "freeze the Warsaw Convention in its 1929 mold,"
the Evangelinos court believed that the danger of violence, "whether
in the form of terrorism, hijacking or sabotage," is today so closely
associated with air transportation as to be considered an "inherent"
risk of air travel.5 3 On this basis, the court considered its conclusion
consistent with the Convention's original goal of governing the risks
then thought to be inherent in air carriage.
54
In contrast to the majority's analysis, Chief Judge Seitz argued
that a terrorist attack which takes place within the confines of an
airport terminal is "no more likely than the bombing of a restaurant,
bank or other public place," 5 5 and for that reason cannot be considered
a risk inherent in air transportation.
Unlike the majority of the court, which regarded a passenger's
activities as primarily determinative of whether the passenger was
engaged in the operations of embarking, Chief Judge Seitz adopted a
two step approach that would examine both location and activity.
Under this approach, the threshold determination would be "whether a
passenger's injuries were sustained in an area exposed to the particular
risks of air navigation." 56 Based on his interpretation of the Conven-
tion Minutes and subsequent commentary, Chief Judge Seitz con-
cluded that "[u]nder no circumstances were accidents inside the air-
port terminal regarded [by the delegates] as within the scope of the
treaty." 57 The dissent reasoned that an examination of the passenger's
activities is necessary only after it has been determined that an indi-
vidual was situated "in the immediate vicinity of an airplane where the
risks of air travel are logically encountered. "8
The second step of this approach involved scrutinizing a passen-
ger's conduct to determine whether, objectively viewed, his activities
are within the scope of article 17. Applying this approach, Chief Judge
Seitz maintained that:
52. Id.
53. Id. at 157.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 159.
56. Id. at 160.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 163.
Vol. 7
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Only those passengers who have departed from the safety of
the terminal and are engaged in the activity of boarding or
any of the steps which immediately precede boarding should
be granted recovery.
5 9
The dissent further asserted that the majority's analysis of the
element of airline control over passengers was "at best imprecise,"
60
since passengers are at many locations within the terminal under the
control of the airlines. In addition, the dissent noted that the majority
apparently required -that a person entitled to recover under article 17 be
a member of an identifiable group associated with a particular flight
and located with a specific geographical area designated by the air-
line. 6' This, the dissent argued, turns "control" into a "mere artifice
to permit recovery within the terminal, yet under limited circum-
stances. "62
III. MARTINEZ HERNANDEZ V. AIR FRANCE
Subsequent to the Day and Evangelinos decisions, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals was presented in Martinez Hernandez v. Air
France63 with the problem of determining whether passengers were
"disembarking" within the meaning of article 17 when they were
injured during a terrorist attack at Lod International Airport near Tel
Aviv, Israel.
A. The Attack at Lod Airport
The Martinez Hernandez plaintiffs and their decedents were
passengers on Air France flight 132 from New York through Paris and
Rome to Tel Aviv, Israel. Three Japanese, in the service of a Palestin-
ian terrorist organization, boarded the plane at Rome. On arrival at
Lod Airport, the passengers descended the stairs to the ground and
walked or rode on a bus about one-third mile to the terminal building.
There they presented their passports for inspection by Israeli immigra-
tion officials and then passed into the main baggage area of the
terminal. While the passengers were awaiting the arrival of the bag-
gage from the plane, the three Japanese terrorists removed their lug-
gage from the conveyor belt, produced submachine guns and hand
59. Id.
60. Id. at 164.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 545 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 1976), aff'g In re Tel Aviv, 405 F. Supp. 154 (D.P.R.
1975).
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grenades, and opened fire upon persons in the baggage area, killing
and wounding many.
B. The Hernandez Decision
In Martinez Hernandez, the First Circuit Court affirmed the
decision of the lower court granting a dismissal of the complaint. The
lower court had held that the attack did not occur during disembarka-
tion. It based its decision 64 upon the First Circuit Court's opinion in
MacDonald v. Air France,65 in which the plaintiff left the airplane,
cleared customs, and arrived in the common terminal baggage area.
There the plaintiff, a seventy-four year old woman, was found on the
floor, but no testimony was presented to describe the cause of her fall.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, presuming that some internal
condition was the cause of the fall, held that the airline was not liable
under article 17 of the Warsaw Convention both because the plaintiff
had not proved that an "accident" 66 within the meaning of article 17
had occurred and because the injury did not occur during disembarka-
tion. The MacDonald court stated:
[I]t would seem that the operation of disembarking has ter-
minated by the time the passenger has descended from the
plane . . . and has reached a safe point inside the terminal,
even though he may remain in the status of a passenger of
the carrier while inside the building . . . . Neither the
economic rationale for liability limits, nor the rationale for
the shift in the burden of proof, applies to accidents which
are far removed from the operation of aircraft.67
In affirming the Martinez Hernandez lower court, the First Cir-
cuit, in an opinion written by Chief Judge Coffin, was of the view that
its holding in MacDonald did not foreclose necessarily the adoption of
Day-Evangelinos tripartite test which focuses on the activity in which
the passengers were engaged, their location and the extent to which
they were under the control of the carrier. 68 Applying this test, the
court first observed that some passengers have no need to retrieve
64. 405 F. Supp. 154, 155-56 (D.P.R. 1975).
65. 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971).
66. 439 F.2d 1402, 1404-05 (1st Cir. 1971). It was undisputed in Day and
Evangelinos that the attack constituted an "accident" within the purview of article 17.
Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95, 99 (W.D. Pa. 1975). See also
Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd mem., 485
F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973); Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322,
1323 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
67. 439 F.2d 1402, 1405 (1st Cir. 1971).
68. 545 F.2d 279, 282 (1st Cir. 1976).
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baggage.69 Therefore, the court believed that picking up baggage is not
an activity that is necessary to effect a passenger's separation from the
plane. The court further found that the long distance from the passen-
ger's location within the terminal building to the aircraft, militated
against finding the passengers in the course of disembarking. 70 Finally,
the court observed that unlike the embarking passengers in Day and
Evangelinos, who were segregated into a group at the direction of
airline employees, the passengers in Martinez Hernandez were appar-
ently "free agents roaming at will." 71 The court asserted that:
[I]nasmuch as the carrier's duty to protect passengers from
the acts of third parties arises not from the carrier's ability to
control the third party but from the relationship between
carrier and passenger, the scope of article 17 should be lim-
ited to those situations either where the carrier has taken
charge of the passengers, or possibly where it customarily
would have done so.
72
The court's decision differed from Day and Evangelinos in its
refusal to hold the carrier liable because of considerations of cost
allocation. Although not unsympathetic to these considerations, the
court believed that "if its application is not to do violence to the
history and language of the Warsaw Convention, there should. . . be
a close logical nexus between the injury and air travel per se." 73 This
reflects the court's opinion that the delegates to the Warsaw Conven-
tion intended a restrictive definition of embarking and disembarking.
The Martinez Hernandez court, in agreement with Chief Judge Seitz's
dissenting opinion in Evangelinos,4 emphasized that a terrorist attack,
unlike a hijacking, is "not a risk characteristic of travel by aircraft, but
rather is a risk of living in a world such as ours." 75 By maintaining this
position, the court disagreed with a fundamental premise of the Day
and Evangelinos opinions.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ELEMENTS IN THE COURTS' DECISIONS
It is a general rule of treaty interpretation to give effect to the
"ordinary meaning" of the terms of the treaty in their context and in
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 283 (footnote omitted).
72. Id. at n,4 (emphasis added), citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A
(1965); Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886
(1934).
73. 545 F.2d 279, 284 (Ist Cir. 1976).
74. 550 F.2d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 1977) (dissenting opinion). See text accompanying
note 55 supra.
75. 545 F.2d 279, 284 (Ist Cir. 1976).
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light of its object and purpose.76 It is readily apparent, however, that
the phrase "in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking" is not susceptible to a clear "ordinary meaning".
Indeed, air law scholars have long been cognizant of the varying
interpretations applicable to the phrase and the need for further defini-
tion. 77 Consequently, rather than relying upon a mere textual interpre-
tation of article 17, the Day, Evangelinos and Martinez Hernandez
courts considered other elements of interpretation to support their
holdings. The disparate conclusions reached in those cases are pri-
marily a result of the courts' divergent analyses of several important
interpretive elements: the legislative history of article 17, subsequent
commentary thereon, the use of policy considerations and the applica-
bility of disembarking cases. In order to determine the proper interpre-
tation of the scope of article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, these
elements will be examined more closely.
A. The Legislative History of Article 17
Following the well established practice of looking at the legisla-
tive history of a treaty to aid in the interpretation of its provisions,78 the
courts in Day, Evangelinos, and Martinez Hernandez examined the
minutes of the Warsaw Convention. Of special pertinence was the
discussion of draft Convention article 20, from which the present
article 17 was derived. Drafted by the Comit6 Internationale Tech-
nique d'Experts Juridique Aeriens (CITEJA) 79, article 20 provided
that:
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 147()(a) (1965); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, para. 1,
opened for signature May 23, 1969, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875, 885 (1969). For an analysis of
the two main schools of treaty interpretation, see Merrills, Two Approaches to Treaty
Interpretations, 1968-1%9 AUSTR. Y.B. INT'L L. 55 (1969); see also Comment, Air
Law-Foreign Language Treaty Interpretation-Recovery of Damages for Mental In-
juries in Airplane Hijackings, 8 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 55 (1975).
77. See, e.g., Beaumont, Need for Revision and Amplification of the Warsaw
Convention, 16 J. AIR L. & COM. 395, 401 (1949).
78. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943), wherein the
Court stated in reference to treaties:
To ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the
history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted
by the parties.
Accord, Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294 (1933); Cook v. United States, 288
U.S. 102, 112 (1933). See also Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323,
336-38 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968), wherein the court stated with
regard to the Warsaw Convention: "[T]he determination in an American court of the
meaning of an international convention drawn by continental jurists is hardly possible
without considering the conception, parturition, and growth of the convention." Id. at
336; MCNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES 411-23 (1961).
79. International Technical Committee of Aerial Legal Experts. The preparatory
ol. 7
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The period of carriage [liability] shall extend from the mo-
ment when the travelers, goods, or baggage enter the aero-
drome of departure up to the moment when they leave from
the aerodrome of destination; it does not cover any carriage
whatsoever outside the limits of an airport, other than by
aircraft."0
Although most delegates agreed on the period of liability with
respect to goods and baggage, the Warsaw minutes indicate that there
was extensive controversy as to when liability for passengers should
attach.8'
Urging rejection of draft article 20, the delegate from Brazil,
Alcibiades Peganha, asked his fellow delegates, "Can one make the
carrier liable for the life of a passenger before he has boarded the
aircraft? How many accidents can occur within the boundaries of the
aerodrome before departure takes place? ' 8 2 He proposed that the
language of article 20 be amended:
To replace "from the moment when travelers, goods and
baggage enter the aerodrome of departure up to the moment
when they leave the aerodrome of destination" by "from the
moment when the travelers have boarded and the goods or
baggage have been delivered to the forwarder.
83
work for the Warsaw Convention, including the formulation of draft articles, was begun
at the First Conference Internationale de Droit Priv6 A6rien, held in Paris in October and
November, 1925. The Paris Conference appointed a commission of experts in interna-
tional air law, CITEJA, which was charged with studying and suggesting changes in the
draft articles presented at the Paris Conference. At the Third Session of the CITEJA, in
Madrid, in May of 1928, a final version of a draft convention was adopted. It was this
draft that was before the delegates as they met in Warsaw, Poland, in October of 1929, to
draw up the final Convention. For full details of the CITEJA in connection with the
preparation of the Warsaw Convention, see Ide, The History and Accomplishments of
the International Technical Committee of Aerial Legal Experts C.I.T.E.J.A., 3 J. AIR L.
& COM. 27 (1932); Latchford, The Warsaw Convention and the C.L T.E.J.A., 6 J. AIR L.
& CoM. 79 (1935).
80. It CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PRIvE AERIEN, 4-12 OCT. 1929, at
171 (1930) [hereinafter cited as WARSAW MINUTES] (emphasis added). Translation from
French by Professor Michael Riffaterre, Columbia University.
81. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95, 100 (W.D. Pa.
1975). In Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 395 n.10, 314 N.E.2d
848, 854 n.10, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97, 105 n.10 (1974), the Court of Appeals for the State of
New York noted that:
[Tihe debate over this article [171 centered around the issue of when the air
carrier's liability for damage to passengers should begin and end rather than
the scope of compensable injuries.
82. WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 80, at 49. Translation from SECOND INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW OCTOBER 4-12, 1929 WARSAW
MINUTES 71 (R. Horner & D. Legrez transl. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Horner &
Legrez].
83. Horner& Legrez, supra note 82, at 71; translation of WARSAW MINUTES, supra
note 80, at 49 (emphasis added).
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Professor George Ripert, the French delegate, argued that article
20 should be referred to the drafting committee to create a new text that
would clearly distinguish between travelers and goods.84 Because
Ripert believed that the delegates would "never arrive at finding a
formula indicating when the contract of carriage begins and ends,"
85
he suggested that the delegates be "content to employ a general
formula-'during air carriage'-[and leave] to the courts the duty of
deciding in each case if one is within the contract of carriage. "86
During the discussions which followed the various proposals, the
delegates voiced considerable dissatisfaction with the expansive provi-
sion for passenger liability embodied in article 20. They also expressed
a widespread belief that the article should be submitted to the drafting
committee for revision.
8 7
Several delegates recognized that more than a mere rewording of
the CITEJA draft was involved; in addition, important questions of
substance were being raised by the various proposed amendments.
88
The British delegate summarized the dispute as follows:
It seems to me that here there are questions of principle upon
which one can pass before the referral to the drafting com-
mitee.
For example, as regards travelers, does liability begin,
as it is said in the draft [article 20], upon the entrance into the
aerodrome of departure, or does it begin when the traveler is
on board the aircraft? Here is the divergence as it exists as
regards the travelers: When must liability begin? Following
the principle established in the draft of the Convention, or
simply when the traveler is on board?
It's a question upon which I ask that one pass before the
referral to the drafting committee. 9
The Reporter then stated:
We should make a decision first of all on the carriage of
travelers and then on the carriage of goods. The situation, in
effect, can be different.
84. Horner & Legrez, supra note 82, at 73, 78; translation of WARSAW MINUTES,
supra note 80, at 50, 54.
85. Horner & Legrez, supra note 82, at 73; translation of WARSAW MINUTES, supra
note 80, at 50.
86. Id.
87. 550 F.2d 152, 161 (3d Cir. 1977) (Chief Judge Seitz, dissenting).
88. Horner & Legrez, supra note 82, at 80-82; translation of WARSAW MINUTES,
supra note 80, at 55-56.
89. Homer & Legrez, supra note 82, at 80-81; translation of WARSAW MINUTES,
supra note 80, at 55.
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In the carriage of travelers, there is a double solution
possible: either maintaining the text which would consist in
engaging the liability of the carrier as soon as the passenger
enters the aerodrome, or accepting the suggestion which was
made which consists in saying that the liability is engaged as
soon as the traveler has embarked on the aircraft.
I point out again that this last solution, practically, is not
one at all, and facilitates nothing at all, because the judge will
always have to specify the moment when the liability of the
carrier begins. In effect, the passenger can have steped [sic]
on the step-up of the aircraft, the step-up which is not an
actual part of the aircraft, and be injured by another aircraft.
Be that as it may, the proposal is very clear.
90
After Professor Ripert reiterated his proposal of referring to the
drafting committee a text based "on the distinction to be established
between travelers and goods," 9 1 the delegate from Luxemborg re-
sponded:
It seems indispensible to me to indicate first of all to the
drafting committee the directives which it will have to follow
to prepare its text; if not, the drafting committee will work in
a void, it will perform a work which will be admitted or
rejected. So that, before deciding to refer to the drafting
committee, it is indispensible to vote in the sense of the
proposals made by the British Delegation, which dis-
criminated very well between the various cases. When the
conference will have made a decision on these points which
will be submitted to a vote, then the drafting committee will
be able to work in a useful manner. 92
Peganha, the Brazilian delegate, then agreed with Ripert and the
French delegation on the subject of goods, but cautioned his fellow
delegates as to the choice they were making with respect to passengers:
I draw the attention of the Assembly to that upon which we
are going to vote. It's a question of saying, whether the
liability of the carrier begins as soon as the traveler enters
into the aerodrome, which is a public place, or when he
embarks on the aircraft.93
90. Horner& Legrez, supra note 82, at 81; translation of WARSAW MINUTES, supra
note 80, at 55-56.
91. Horner & Legrez, supra note 82, at 81-82; translation of WARSAW MINUTES,
supra note 80, at 56.
92. Horner & Legrez, supra note 82, at 82; translation of WARSAW MINUTES, supra
note 80, at 56.
93. Id.
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Thereafter, a vote was taken which rejected the proposed draft of
article 20. Perhaps the most problematic discussion of the debates
then took place:
THE PRESIDENT: We are now going to vote on the other
proposal concerning the carriage of passengers that we have
not decided. It's a question of saying that the liability of the
carrier begins at the moment when the passenger embarks on
the aircraft. Now, I don't know if perhaps we shouldn't
consider the rejection of the text proposed by the draft of the
Convention as the acceptance of the other proposal?
MR GIANNINI (Italy): I understood. . . that if one voted
against the text of the draft of the Convention, that meant
that one accepted the other proposal, that is to say, referral
to the drafting committee.
(General agreement).
THE PRESIDENT: There is not opposition to this point of
view? . . . Then, it is thus so decided. We refer to the
drafting committee."
Shortly thereafter, when the Soviet delegate inquired of the situa-
tion regarding carriage of passengers, the President replied, "We have
said that the rejection of the present article [20] led to the acceptance of
the opposite principle."96 Following revision, the current article 17
emerged from the drafting committee and was adopted without further
debate. 
97
The question as to what the "other proposal" agreed upon actual-
ly has never been firmly resolved. During the Convention debates,
Mr. Giannini, the Italian delegate, stated that with respect to passen-
gers, "it is necessary to ally oneself with the Delegation of Brazil."
98
Moreover, in 1932, Giannini wrote concerning the effect of the change
from the draft to the final text of article 17:
In this way the grave and unjustifiable rule proposed by
CITEJA to have liability commence at the moment of entry
into or exit from, respectively, the airport of departure or
arrival, is eliminated. 99
94. Homer & Legrez, supra note 82, at 83; translation of WARSAW MINUTES, supra
note 80, at 57.
95. Id.
96. Horner & Legrez, supra note 82, at 84; translation Of WARSAW MINUTES, supra
note 80, at 57 (emphasis added).
97. Horner & Legrez, supra note 82, at 205-06; translation of WARSAW MINUTES,
supra note 80, at 135-36.
98. Homer & Legrez, supra note 82, at 74; translation of WARSAW MINUTES, supra
note 80, at 50-51.
99. A. GIANNINI, SAGGI DI DIRITTO AERONAUTICO 223 (1932). It is noteworthy that
Mr. Giannini refers only to the "airport of departure or arrival" which encompasses the
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This would tend to indicate that the proposal which Giannini be-
lievedl °° to have been accepted by the rejection of the CITEJA draft
was that of the Brazilian delegation.
Consistent with this position, TWA argued that the rejection of
the CITEJA draft manifested an intent to exclude from Warsaw cover-
age all accidents occurring within a terminal building. 10 1 Rejecting
TWA's argument, the Second Circuit Court in Day was of the opinion
that the delegates' action "constituted a rejection of a rigid location-
based test in favor of the more flexible approach espoused by Professor
Ripert."' 0 2 The majority opinion of the Third Circuit in Evangelinos
concluded that "the debates indicate confusion among the delegates
themselves as to the meaning of the rejection of the CITEJA draft."103
The dissent of Chief Judge Seitz, however, believed there was "over-
whelming evidence" to support the view that:
[I]n rejecting the CITEJA draft of Article 20, the delegates
intended to signify their approval of a proposal which would
limit an airline's liability for personal injuries to those in-
juries which occurred during flight or while the passenger
was boarding. Their subsequent adoption of Article 17 must
be viewed as an affirmance of this more restrictive concept
of liability. It appears likely that the phrase "during the
course of any of the operations of embarking" was inserted
in order to make explicit that the Article covered the passen-
ger who was on the stairway preparing to enter the airplane
in addition to passengers who had already boarded."'
Reaching a conclusion similar to that of Chief Judge Seitz, the
First Circuit Court believed that "the CITEJA draft was rejected in
favor of the more restrictive view"10 5 of Mr. Peganha of Brazil. The
court stated that "the delegates understood embarkation and disembar-
kation as essentially the physical activity of entering or exiting from an
aircraft, rather than as a broader notion of initiating or ending a
trip."' 0 6 Similarly, the District Court of Puerto Rico in Martinez
Hernandez found that:
entire airfield and not merely the airport terminal building. See Evangelinos v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 158 n.11 (3d Cir. 1977).
100. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
101. Brief for Appellee at 18-19, Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d
152 (3d Cir. 1977).
102. 525 F.2d 31, 35 n.12 (2d Cir. 1975).
103. 550 F.2d 152, 158 (3d Cir. 1977).
104. Id. at 162 (dissenting opinion).
105. 545 F.2d 279, 283 (1st Cir. 1976).
106. Id. at 283-84. The Martinez Hernandez court noted that:
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The legislative history . . makes clear that in drafting Article 17
the delegates to the Convention specifically intended to ex-
clude from coverage accidents occuring to passengers inside
an airport terminal building.107
The position of the Day court is not supported by the delegates'
remarks surrounding the rejection of the CITEJA draft. Although the
final text did distinguish between passengers and goods, 0 8 it would be
incorrect to suggest, on the basis of this difference, that Professor
Ripert's proposal be considered "opposite" in principle to draft article
20. Rather, the commentary recorded in the minutes virtually compels
the conclusion that the "opposite principle" refers to that of the
Brazilian proposal. It is evident that the text of article 17 is not
precisely that of the Brazilian proposal. Nevertheless, the analysis of
the minutes by Chief Judge Seitz and the Martinez Hernandez courts is
[T]he hypothetical cases which the delegates posed as problems concerned
such cases as accidents occurring as one stepped onto the stairs leading to the
aircraft, . . .or after boarding but before takeoff .... By contrast there was
no doubt that injuries sustained, for example, while eating in an airport
restaurant, . . . walking through the airport, . . . or while walking through
town during a stopover, would not be covered.
Id. at 284 n.7.
In his memorandum for the United States as amicus curiae, Solicitor General
Robert Bork states, "The delegates then voted to reject the CITEJA proposal and to
refer to the drafting committee the alternate proposal 'that the liability of the carrier
begins at the moment when the passenger embarks on the aircraft.' " Memorandum for
the United Staes as Amicus Curiae at 8, Trans World Airlines, Inc., v. Day, 429 U.S. 890
(1976) denying cert., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975). The Solicitor General further states
that, "It may well be that the delegates, or a majority of them, did not envision that 'any
of the operations of embarking' could take place within an air terminal." Id. at 9.
Although the Solicitor General was "uncertain what conclusion we would reach if the
facts of this case were presented to us as a completely original matter," he could not say
that the result reached by the Day courts was clearly wrong, and thus recommended that
the writ of certiorari be denied. Id. at 12, 14.
107. 405 F. Supp. 154, 157 (D.P.R. 1975).
108. WARSAW CONVENTION, supra note 3, at 3019. Article 18 maintained the basic
system originally provided for in draft article 20, providing for liability "if the occur-
rence which caused the damage so sustained took place during the transportation by air."
"Transportation by air" was defined as comprising "the period during which the bag-
gage and goods are in charge of the carrier, whether in the airport or on board an aircraft,
or, in the case of a landing outside an airport, in any place whatsoever." (emphasis
added).
The distinction between passengers and property recognized that passengers might
expose themselves of their own volition to situations of peril which inanimate articles
such as goods and baggage cannot do. In addition, once a consignor delivers goods to the
carrier, the former has no means of establishing the moment when any damages occur,
since the carrier is in complete control of the goods. These considerations dictate that
liability is to attach upon delivery of the goods to the carrier. See D. GOEDHUIS,
NATIONAL AIRLEGISLATIONS AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION 189 (1937) [hereinafter cited
as GOEDHUIS]; Sullivan, The Codification of Air Carrier Liability by International Con-
vention, 7 J. AIR L. & COM. 1, 23 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan].
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clearly the more accurate, and the one supported by the debates and
subsequent commentary by air law scholars.
B. Subsequent Commentary on Article 17
Prior to the recent trio of cases, discussion by air law experts on
the scope of the terms "embarking" and "disembarking" focused on
whether these terms embrace only a passenger's actual climbing into
and out of the aircraft, or whether they also extend to the period when a
passenger is on the traffic apron. At the Fifth International Congress on
Air Navigation held in 1930, only one year after the Warsaw Conven-
tion, a leading air law expert, Dr. Goedhuis, presented a paper in
which he summarized the prevailing interpretations of article 17 as
follows:
[A]rt. 17 mentions 'embarquement' and 'debarquement'.
The question is how to explain these words? There are two
views viz: a) in a broad sense: i.e. the embarking begins
when the passenger leaves the station-building on his way to
the aeroplane, standing in the flying-field; the disembarking
ends when the passenger, arrived at destination, enters the
station-building b) in a narrow sense, i.e.: the getting on
board and the alightment only comprise the actual getting in
and out of the aeroplane.'°9
Although Dr. Goedhuis favored the broad interpretation, 110 as
have most subsequent air law text writers,I 1 others present, including
Dr. Wolterbeek-Miiller, president of the Congress' legal section and
the Dutch delegate to the Warsaw Convention, claimed the proper
interpretation was the "narrow" view. 1 2 Under either view, however,
passengers injured inside of the air terminal would not be within the
ambit of article 17.
109. Goedhuis, Observations Concerning Chapter 3 of the Convention of Warschau
1929, in CINQUiEME CONGRES INTERNATIONAL DE LA NAVIGATION AERIENNE, 1-6 SEPT.,
1930, 1163-64 (1931) [hereinafter cited as FIFTH CONGRESS].
110. Id. at 1173.
111. See, e.g., H. DRION, LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 83
(1954); M. LEMOINE, TRAITE DE DROIT AERIEN 539-40 (1947) [hereinafter cited as
LEMOINEI; D. LUREAU, LA RESPONSABILITE Du TRANSPORTEUR AiRIEN 90 (1961); 0.
RIESE & J. LACOUR, PRECIS DE DROIT AiRIEN 265 (1951) (Otto Riese, German delegate to
the Warsaw Convention, states that the Convention excluded those accidents having
taken place while the passenger "is in the airport terminal buildings."); J. VAN HoUTrE,
LA RESPONSIBILITE CIVILE DANS LES TRANSPORTS AERIENS, INTERIERS ET INTER-
NATIONAUX 80 (1940); Chauveau, Note, [1968] D.S. JUR. 517 [hereinafter cited as
Chauveaul.
112. FIFTH CONGRESS, supra note 109, at 1173.
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Dr. Goedhuis, however, has written also that there is no way of
knowing what the delegates actually meant:
It is to be regretted that the solution proposed by the commit-
tee was adopted without any discussion. [Tihe interpretation
of the term . . . gives rise to divergent opinions and since
the expression was not discussed, the minutes cannot there-
fore give any explanations on this subject.
113
As previously noted, 14 the courts in Day, Evangelinos, and
Martinez Hernandez sought to define "embarkation" or "disembar-
kation" partially in terms of hazards associated with air transportation.
A similar approach has been taken by several air law scholars. 115 As
early as 1936, one American writer, Mr. Sullivan, recommended the
following definition:
These operations commence, where embarkation takes place
at an airport operated with a restraining barrier for passen-
gers about to go aboard, when passage is made through such
gate, and vice versa, on disembarking, and that in other
situations, such operations shall be deemed to have com-
menced when the passenger is exposed to the particular
hazards of transportation by air. 116
He posed the hypothetical situation of a passenger, present in the
airport waiting room for the purpose of embarkation, being injured. He
wrote that
no hazard peculiar to air navigation has been encountered.
To permit the air carrier to limit his liability as a waiting-
room [sic] operator would be a discrimination against every
operator of railway or bus passenger stations.
11 7
Further, he noted that "an international convention is not necessary to
govern the liability of an air line company in its capacity as waiting
room proprietor." 1
8
Similarly, in 1947, French air law scholar Maurice Lemoine" 19
pointed out that since the Warsaw Convention had been intended to
apply to the risks inherent in air exploitation and transportation, the
113. GOEDHUIS, supra note 108, at 192.
114. See text accompanying notes 40-41, 53-55, 74-75, supra.
115. See GOEDHUIS, supra note 108, at 195; W. GULDIMANN, INTERNATIONALES
LUFTTRANSPORTRECHT 100 n.4 (1965); LEMOINE, supra note 11, at 539; R. RODIERE,
DROIT DES TRANSPORTS 366 (1973); R. ST.-ALARY, LE DROIT AERIEN 177 (1955); Sullivan,
supra note 108, at 22.
116. Sullivan, supra note 108, at 22.
117. Id, at 20, 21.
118. Id. at 20.
119. LEMOINE, supra note 111, at § 811.
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regime becomes operative only when the passenger finds himself
exposed to these risks. He observed that "the passenger, when he goes
freely in the building of the airport, goes to the cafeteria, to the waiting
room, to the newstand [for example], has not yet started to undergo the
air risks.' ' 20 Therefore, in a hypothetical situation, Lemoine would
not have allowed an injury caused by a broken stairway inside the air
port to engage the provisions of the Convention.' 2' He writes that
"from the moment the passenger leaves the building of the airport to
get on the departure area, the passenger is in the field of arien
risks"' 22 and the carrier's liability commences.
Taking a contrary view, French air law scholar Dean Paul
Chauveau argues that courts should not be encumbered with disputes in
which the parties argue whether the accident is a risk specifically
related to the airien mode of transportation so as to justify recourse to
the Convention. 23 He points out that "since the Warsaw Convention
constitutes one uniform law for air carriers, it applies for everything or
nothing at all.' ' 124 He further states:
[Iff the air risks explain and justify the particular regime
which rules air transportation, the application of the Warsaw
Convention has never been dependent upon the effective
realization of a risk of that nature. It rules all transportation
. . . without distinction or condition from the beginning to
end. 125
Similar reasoning was adopted by Judge McEntee in his concurring
opinion in Martinez Hernandez. It was his view that "a terrorist attack
should be subjected to the same analysis for Article 17 purposes as any
other tortious act." ' 26 This position seems consistent with article 17,
which does not differentiate between the various possible causes of an
injury. Certainly a test based upon which hazards are inherent in air
travel would be open to endless debate, and such an approach would
provide little guidance in construing the meaning of article 17.127 If the
Convention, as modified by the Montreal Agreement, is to be regarded




123. Chauveau, supra note I11, at 517. (Transl. by Michele Margin, graduate stu-
dent and instructor of French at University of California at San Diego).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 545 F.2d 279, 285 n.2 (lst Cir. 1976) (concurring opinion).
127. See Chauveau, note 111 supra.
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reasonably drawn between an airline's responsibility to a person in-
jured as a result of a terrorist attack and one injured by slipping on a
banana peel in the air terminal while standing in line for a security
inspection.
C. Policy Considerations
As previously noted, 128 the Day court relied in part on policy
considerations to support its broad interpretation of article 17. In so
doing, the court followed a trend, especially promoted by the New
York courts,' 29 which interprets the various articles of the Convention
in a manner that will afford recovery to injured passengers. The
apparent basis for allowing recovery when it might be denied under a
different interpretation of the Convention is the courts' recognition that
the airline industry no longer needs the extensive protection it once
did, and that emphasis today should be on the protection of passengers
rather than airlines.' 30 Consequently, courts which consider compensa-
tion to be a societal responsibility' 3' have been willing to go to great
lengths to construe the relevant articles in a way that enables them to
find the carrier liable for passenger injuries.'
32
Although cost allocation theories such as those adopted by the
Day court have been used to extend a defendant's liability in domestic
tort cases, 3 3 they bear little relation to the proper interpretation of the
128. See text accompanying notes 31-35 supra.
129. See, e.g., Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F.Supp. 237
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (divided court), aff'd, 170 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 455
(1968), reh. denied, 391 U.S. 929 (1968) (inadequate notice of articles 3 and 4 in passenger
ticket); Eck v. United Arab Air Lines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1966) (liberal interpre-
tation of "place of business" in article 28(1)); Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341
F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965) (liberal interpretation of
"delivery" in article 3(2)); Reed v. Wiser, 414 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding that
the Warsaw Convention does not limit the liability of carrier's corporate officers);
Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiam,
485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973) (construing "accident" of article 17 as including hijacking);
Boryk v. Aerolineas Argentina, 332 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (size of type and form
of notice in ticket not adequate).
130. Reed v. Wiser, 414 F.Supp. 863, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); See Note, Warsaw
Convention-Carrier Liability-Mental Anguish and Distress are not Encompassed as a
Matter of Law by the Clause "any Other Bodily Injury" Under Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 433, 438 (1973).
131. See Kreindler, A Plaintiff's View of Montreal, 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 525, 531
(1963).
132. Mankiewicz, Judicial Diversification of Uniform Private Law Convention: The
Warsaw Convention's Days in Court, 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 718, 725-26 (1972)
[hereinafter cited to as Mankiewicz].
133. See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 569-70 (9th Cir.1974), wherein
similar policy arguments as those advanced by the Day court were used to establish a
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provisions of an international treaty. New developments in the tort law
of one signatory nation should not be permitted to change the interpre-
tation of a treaty. Any application of domestic law must be in accord-
ance with the express terms of the treaty itself. 134 This is particularly
true with respect to a treaty such as the Convention which has been
reexamined without a change to the pertinent language as recently as
1971, when the Guatemala Protocol 35 was drafted.
The Day court, however, stated that in light of the Montreal
Agreement, the Warsaw Convention "now functions to protect the
passenger from the many contemporary hazards of air travel and also
spreads the accident cost of air transportation among all passen-
gers."1 36 For this proposition the court relied on Husserl v. Swiss Air
Transport Co. 137 The Husserl court, however, did not cite any author-
ity in support of this theory,1 38 nor is there any indication in the history
of the Convention or elsewhere that the Convention intended to distri-
bute the costs of accidents in this manner. The Day139 court also found
the 1971 Guatemala Protocol significant in assessing the current goals
of the Convention. The Protocol, adopted by a diplomatic conference
at which fifty-five countries were represented, has been signed by
more than twenty states. It will formally amend the Warsaw Conven-
tion in a manner similar to the Montreal Agreement to provide for
absolute liability up to $100,000.140
However, the Montreal Agreement and Guatemala Protocol clear-
ly do not support the Day court's position on passenger protection.
While it is true that the increase of liability limits and the establishment
duty of due care on the part of an oil company to avoid oil spills in the Santa Barbara
Channel of California. See also CALABRESI, supra note 31, at 69-73, 140-52.
134. American Trust Co. v. Smyth, 247 F.2d 149, 153 (9th Cir. 1957).
135. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relat-
ing to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as amended
by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 September 1955, done at Guatemala City
March 8, 1971, International Civil Aviation Doc. No. 8932. [reproduced in 64 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 555 (1971)] [hereinafter cited as Guatemala Protocol]. See Boyle, The
Guatemala Protocol to the Warsaw Convention, 6 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 41 (1976) for a
thorough analysis of the Protocol. See notes 140-41 infra.
136. 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1975).
137. 351 F. Supp. 702(S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir.
1973).
138. 351 F. Supp. 702, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
139. 528 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1975).
140. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 135, at art. VIII. Because of fluctuations in the
value of gold, the limit is now equivalent to $120,000. Additionally, United States
citizens will have the benefit of a compensation fund which will provide up to $200,000
more to a passenger whose damages exceed the $100,000 limit. See Boyle, The Guatema-
la Protocol to the Warsaw Convention, 6 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 41, 80 (1976).
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of a system of liability without fault indicate a greater sensitivity to the
need for providing for adequate passenger recovery, neither the
Montreal Agreement nor the Guatemala Protocol altered the language
of article 17 defining the scope of liability under the Convention. 141
The class of passengers entitled to recover under the Convention's
provisions remains the same. As stated by Judge Seitz in his dissenting
opinion in Evangelinos, "the Convention's original policy of limiting
an airline's liability of personal injuries caused by the unique perils of
air navigation retains its vitality, notwithstanding the adoption of the
Montreal Agreement.' ' 42 Judge Seitz addressed the Day court's re-
liance on modern theories of accident cost allocation as follows:
While I do not question the soundness of these principles in
appropriate contexts, I believe that the explicit goals and
policies which were voiced by the delegates to the Warsaw
Convention and reaffirmed by the signing of the Montreal
Agreement in 1966 foreclose reference to them in defining
the scope of Article 17. Had the signatories to the Conven-
tion wished to amend it in order to reflect modern devel-
opments in American tort law, they could have affirmatively
acted in 1966 when the monetary damage limitation was
increased and the airline's due care defense was eliminated.
Their failure to do so should not be disregarded, particularly
if we keep in mind that this is an international agreement.' 43
Even if policy considerations are to be considered in the interpre-
tation of the Convention's articles, it is arguable that with respect to
141. Article IV of the Guatemala Protocol provides:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or personal injury of
a passenger upon condition only that the event which caused the death or
injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations
of embarking or disembarking. However, the carrier is not liable if the death or
injury resulted solely from the state of health of the passenger.
Guatemala Protocol, supra note 135 (emphasis added).
During the discussion on article IV, the French delegation proposed that the phrase
"in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking" be replaced by
"in the movement area", and noted that the latter expression was defined in the
Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. The expression "movement
area" is there defined as "that part of a manoeuvering area and aprons." The intention
of the French delegation was to limit the scope of the rule of absolute liability strictly to
the risks of air carriage. That delegation sought to avoid the possibility that the original
phrase might be construed broadly by some courts. The proposal was rejected. Some
delegates considered that passengers who, for example, went directly from the aircraft
into a tunnel would not touch the movement area at all, and that the reference to
embarkation and disembarkation had been relatively well interpreted. See FitzGerald,
The Revision of the Warsaw Convention, 8 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 239, 293 (1970).
142. 550 F.2d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 1977) (dissenting opinion).
143. Id. at 163.
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passenger recovery, a narrow construction is preferable. In this regard,
it is important to note that in many situations involving injury to a
passenger, it is the airline seeking the benefit of the liability limitations
which argues for the application of the Warsaw Convention and
Montreal Agreement. 144 A restrictive view of "embarking" or "dis-
embarking", that is, one which extends only to those cases where the
treaty clearly applies, would leave to passengers their remedies under
local law.
In most cases, those remedies would not be illusory. As the
Martinez Hernandez court pointed out, "contemporary theories of
cost allocation may well be reflected in the provisions of local law." 
1 45
Moreover, under the local law of many jurisdictions, passengers may
be able to recover to the full extent of their injuries by establishing a
breach of the carrier's duty to exercise a "high degree of care" for the
safety of its passengers. 146 This high standard of care applies through-
out the passenger-carrier relationships, including the time during
which the passenger is in the carrier terminal. 147 Furthermore, the high
standard of care may extend to the protection of passengers from the
"vicious acts of third parties",' 48 which presumably would include
terrorist attacks.
D. Disembarking Cases
Prior to cases of Day and Evangelinos, United States courts had
not confronted the problem of determining precisely when the "opera-
tions of embarking" commence. 149 The period of "disembarking",
144. See, e.g., Felismina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 13 Av. Cas. 17,145
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also note 153 infra.
145. 545 F.2d 279, 284 (1st Cir. 1976). The Martinez Hernandez court observed
further that expansion of carrier liability under article 17 to include all terrorist attacks at
airports would produce anomalous results. Under article 17, passengers would have a
strict liability remedy against the carrier, whereas nonpassengers injured by the same
attack would be limited to domestic remedies. The court believed that when dealing with
the "grey area" of cases not clearly involving disembarking, it would be more rational to
treat passengers and nonpassengers alike, leaving to all of them the remedies available
under local law. Id.
146. See, e.g., Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 217, 223 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Comment, Embarking and Disembarking: the Parameters of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, 9 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 251, 266 & n.89 (1976).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. For a case involving article 17, where "embarking" was partially in issue, see
Chutter v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 4 Av. Cas. 17,733 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), where
plaintiff, who had boarded the aircraft, got up from her seat and proceeded toward an
open door of the aircraft in order to wave farewell to her daughter. Plaintiff stepped from
the plane into a space between it and a loading ramp, falling to the ground. The court
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however, had been construed by courts in the United States' 50 and
France. 15 The decisions in these disembarking cases tended to support
TWA's claim that passengers injured inside an air teminal are not
within the ambit of article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. Thus, the
Day and Evangelinos courts were faced with the question of whether
the logic and rationale of cases involving disembarking should be
equally applicable to cases where embarking is alleged.
On the one hand, district court Judge Brieant in Day, "distin-
guished readily"' 52 the case of Felismina v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc. , 53 on the basis that it involved a claimed disembarking under
article 17. The Day court observed that the disembarking passenger
"is not herded in lines, and has few activities, if any, which the air
stated that, "[W]ithout embarking upon a detailed analysis of the plaintiff's physical
position at the time of her fall," it was satisfied that the accident was within the scope of
article 17. "To hold otherwise," said the court, "would be an unwarranted dissection of
minute and almost indefinable areas from the coverage of the Convention." Id. at
17.734. See also Scarf v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 4 Av. Cas. 17,795 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
(Action subject to Warsaw Convention found where plaintiff was injured while boarding
the aircraft when a plane from the same carrier passed close by and moved the ramp
which plaintiff was mounting).
150. MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1 st Cir. 1971); see text accompanying
notes 66-67 supra; Felismina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 13 Av. Cas. 17,145
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), see note 153 infra; Klein v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 46 App. Div.
2d 679, 360 N.Y.S.2d 60 (2d Dept. 1974). In Klein, the plaintiffs were injured inside Lod
Airport, Israel. The court, citing to MacDonald, held that the plaintiffs "having gotten
off the aircraft and arrived safely within the terminal, had disembarked within the
meaning of article 17 of the Warsaw Convention." 46 App. Div. 2d at 679, 360 N.Y.S.2d
at 62.
151. Mach6 v. Air France, [1967] REV. FR. DROIT AERIEN 343 (Cour d' appel
Rouen), aff'd, [1970] REV. FR. DROIT AERIEN 311 (Cour de Cassation); Forsius v. Air
France, [1973] REV. FR. DROIT AERIEN 216 (Trib. gr.inst. de Paris),
152. 393 F. Supp. 217, 222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
153. 13 Av. Cas. 17,145 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Felismina was a passenger aboard a
TWA flight from Lisbon, Portugal to New York. Upon arrival in New York, she left the
aircraft and walked through an expandable horizontal jetway which led from the airplane
door to the terminal proper, She continued across the upper floor of the terminal building
and boarded an escalator leading to a lower level of the terminal where Health and
Immigration, baggage claim and Customs were situated. While on the escalator she was
allegedly pushed, and fell, fracturing her knee. TWA, seeking to apply article 29 of the
Warsaw Convention, which contains a two year period of limitations, moved for sum-
mary judgment dismissing the suit as barred by that statute of limitations. TWA argued
that since the plaintiff had not yet traversed the "exit-gate" which leads to an area open
to the general public, the plaintiff was still in the operations of disembarking, and
therefore the Convention continued to apply. These arguments are clearly in conflict
with TWA's assertions in Day and Evangelinos. Brief for Appellant at 28, Evangelinos
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977). Judge Ward of the Southern
District Court of New York, in a brief memorandum citing no cases or authority, found
that the Warsaw Convention was not applicable because "by the time plaintiff boarded
the down escalator, she had disembarked from defendant's aircraft and that the two-year
period of limitations . . . is inapplicable." 13 Av. Cas. 17,145 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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carrier requires him to perform at all, or in any specific sequence as a
condition of completing his journey.'
154
On the other hand, district court Judge Snyder in Evangelinos,
believed that "many of the steps involved in embarkation, as outlined
by Judge Brieant in Day, are just as essential, although in reverse, to
the steps one must take in disembarking."' 155 The Evangelinos lower
court thus found support in the logic and reasoning of cases involving
disembarking' 5 6 for its conclusion that the plaintiffs were not within
the "operations of embarking."
In reversing the district court in Evangelinos, the majority of the
Third Circuit Court distinguished the disembarking cases of Mac-
Donald v. Air Canada157 and Machi v. Air France158 because they
"involved disembarking, where the nature and extent of the carrier's
control over the passenger and the type of activity in which [the]
plaintiff was engaged differed significantly from [Evangelinos]."'59
In the French case of Machi v. Air France,'60 the plaintiff was
escorted by a stewardess from the plane toward the terminal building.
Because of construction, a detour was taken through the "customs
garden" which was not on the traffic apron. The plaintiff accidentally
stepped on a broken manhole cover and fell into a well, seriously
injuring himself. The trial court stated that one could not restrict the
operations of disembarkment to the crossing of the aircraft gangway,
and gave judgment for the plaintiff. However, the court allowed the
carrier to take advantage of the limitation on liability prescribed by
article 22, the accident having happened in the course of disembarka-
tion. The trial court defined the scope of article 17 as starting at the
moment the passengers are taken into charge by the representative of
154. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
155. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95,102 (W.D. Pa.
1975). The steps outlined by Judge Brieant in Day are as follows:
These passengers could not board the aircraft unless they:
1. presented their tickets to TWA at the checking desk on the upper level; 2.
obtained boarding passes from TWA; 3. obtained baggage checks from TWA;
4. obtained an assigned seat number from TWA; 5. passed through passport
and currency control imposed by the Greek Government; 6. submitted to a
search of their persons for explosives and weapons by Greek police; 7.
submitted their carry-on baggage for similar inspection by Greek police; 8.
walked through Gate 4 to Olympic's bus; 9. boarded the bus; 10. rode in the
bus a distance of 100 yards; and 11. walked off the bus and onto the aircraft.
There is simply no other way to "embark", except by these eleven steps.
Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
156. See note 149 supra.
157. 439 F.2d 1402 (Ist Cir. 1971).
158. [1967] REV. FR. DROIT AERIEN 343 (Court d'appel, Rouen), aff'd, [19701 REV.
FR. DROIT" AERIEN 311 (Cour de Cassation).
159. 550 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1977).
160. [1963] REV. FR. DROIT AERIEN 353 (Cour d'appel, Paris).
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the air carrier and are led to the aircraft under the direction of this
agent, or from the aircraft to the passengers' destination. 161
The Court of Appeals of Rouen,' 62 while agreeing with the trial
court that the accident happened in the course of disembarking, stated
that there must also be a risk incident to air transportation at a point in a
passenger's activity before the Warsaw Convention applies.' 63 The
court reasoned that since the raison d'etre for the limitation of the
carrier's liability was the particular nature of air risks, "it is only to the
extent that these operations are taking place on the traffic apron" that
the Convention could apply. 164 The appeals court in Machi believed
that the "custom garden" was not an area exposed to the risks of air
navigation. Accordingly, it held that the Warsaw Convention was
inapplicable and did not restrict the passenger's potential recovery.' 65
This decision was affirmed by the Cour de Cassation, France's highest
appellate court. 166
The majority in Evangelinos considered neither MacDonald nor
Machi as inconsistent with its conclusion.' 67 The court observed that
both the MacDonald and the Machi courts believed the Convention's
original goal to be the development of rules to govern liability for the
"risks then thought to be inherent in air carriage, and concluded, on
that basis, that the Convention did not apply because the plaintiffs had
reached 'safe' points, distant from such risks."' 68 Since the
Evangelinos court was of the opinion that terrorism was inherent in air
transportation, it concluded that the plaintiffs were not located in such
a "safe place".' 69 The Evangelinos court further distinguished Machi
by noting that it was the plaintiff who was arguing against the applica-
bility of the Warsaw Convention. 1
70
The Evangelinos court's attempt to reconcile its decision with the
holdings in MacDonald and Machi seems strained. Air risks have not
become significantly more closely associated with terminals in the few
years since MacDonald and Machi to warrant broadening the scope of
article 17. Furthermore, a rule of treaty interpretation should not
change with the identity of the party advocating it. Also, it is clear that
161. Id.




166. [1970] REV. FR. DROIT AERIEN 311 (Cour de Cassation).
167. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1977).
168. Id. at 157.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 156-57 n.10.
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the passenger in Machi, who was injured while being escorted across
the runway by the employees of the carrier, was as much under the
control of the carrier as were the Evangelinos passengers. With regard
to these incongruities at least, there is an inescapable conflict between
Evangelinos and Machi.
It is noteworthy that in agreeing with the Day court, the
Evangelinos majority indicated that "there is substantial interest in
uniformity of decision in this area."' 71 Chief Judge Seitz, however,
argued that the interest is in "uniform international interpretation of
the treaty."' 72 Asserting that Day was "inconsistant with prior deci-
sions of the United States courts and, more importantly with the
highest court in France," Judge Seitz maintained that "[i]f deference
is due in order to achieve international uniformity, I believe we should
respect the French interpretation of a treaty which was written and
negotiated in the French language."1
73
The Machi case has been severely criticized by Dean Paul
Chauveau.174 Chauveau observes that in an effort to find Air France
liable, the appellate court stated that during the crossing of the customs
area, a contract of land transportation was substituted for the air
contract, and thus the carrier was liable according to common law. 1
75
Chauveau calls such sectioning a "specious argument" and "contrary
to the unity of contract that has been expressed numerous times by the
Cour de Cassation, as to the Warsaw Convention. "176 Significantly,
Chauveau points out that the word "toutes" 177 as found in article 17,
is not found in the court's decision.
171. Id. at 155.
172. Id. at 160 n.2 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis in original).
173. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 75-1990, slip op. at 13 n.2 (3d
Cir. May 4, 1976) Compare Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 330
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968) (wherein the court stated in dicta that,
'[t]he binding meaning of the terms [of the Warsaw Convention] is the French legal
meaning.") and Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152, 1155 (D.N.M.
1973), with Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 393-94, 314 N.E.2d
848, 853-54, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97, 104-05 (1974) (limiting the application of the official
French text to a determination of the accuracy of the English translation.), and Husserl
v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
174. Chauveau, supra note I11.
175. Id. at 518.
176. Id.
177. The official English version of article 17 translates "toutes" as "any". See
note 14 supra for French version of article 17. The use of the word "any" has been open
to various interpretations. Dr. Goedhuis writes:
The minutes of the meetings of the C.I.T.E.J.A. bring out that one did not
want to consider only embarking or disembarking at the aerodrome of depar-
ture and of destination, but also the operation during a stop en cours de route.
For that reason "during any operations" was used in article 17.
31
Hendlin: Day, Evangelinos, And Martinez Hernandez: Embarking on an Interpr
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1977
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
It is conveniently forgotten, probably to make the violation
of the law less apparent. But it is in the text of the Conven-
tion. . . . To forget the word any may be very clever, but it
is not applying the law; it is deforming or reforming.
178
Because the foremost interest of the Warsaw Convention was the
attainment of uniformity in international air law, the importation of
foreign case law has been considered desirable. 179 Although uni-
formity is a desirous end, deference to foreign courts is not justified if
it would achieve uniformity only at the cost of misconstruction of the
Convention. Failure to follow the Machi precedent would not be
sufficient by itself to adjudge the Day and Evangelinos decisions as
being in error.
Moreover, foreign case law itself is not unfiorm. In the German
case of Blumenfeld v. BEA, 180 the plaintiff was scheduled to fly from
Berlin through Frankfurt to Athens. Shortly before departure, the door
of the waiting room was opened to allow the passengers to walk across
the runway to the airplane. The plaintiff fell on a ramp that led from
the waiting room to the runway. The Court of Appeals of Berlin held
that the plaintiff had embarked in accordance with the meaning of
article 17:
It is questionable that the Warsaw Convention . . . strictly
formed the liability of the carrier solely with regard to the
typical dangers that are directly connected with the use of an
airplane. This interpretation, however, would overlook the
fact that the air carrier has assumed control of the passengers
whenever it invites them to proceed from the waiting room to
the aircraft. Just at this moment, the carrier begins with the
performance of the transport contract. . to provide for the
safety of the passenger and guarantee the begun
commerce. 
181
GOEDHUIS, supra note 104, at 1% (emphasis in original). Contra, BLANC-DANNERY, LA
CONVENTION DE VARSOVIE 64 (1934).
178. Chauveau, supra note 111, at 518.
179. See, Mankiewicz, supra note 132, at 750. One commentator, however, has
criticized resort to foreign case law on the grounds that it "inevitably seems to favor the
strongest party, the air carrier," who can present to the courts "selected foreign
precedents." He points out that the existing compilations of air law cases are either
incomplete or highly selective such as the Air Carriers' Liability Reports (formerly IATA
Law Reporter) circulated by International Air Transport Association to its member
airlines. Sand, The International Unification of Air Law, 30 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 400,
411 & n.99,412 (1965).
180. 11 Z. LuFr. R. 78 (Court of Appeal of Berlin 1962).
181. Id. at 79-80. (Translation by Paulette Rodgers Leahy, and Richard Schwering,
Esq., instructor in German at San Diego State University (emphasis added).
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AN INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 17
The Day and Evangelinos courts' emphasis on control is in harmony
with the Blumenfeld decision and several authors on air law.
8 2
V. CONCLUSION
The inconsistency of the decisions in Day, Evangelinos and
Martinez Hernandez points out the necessity for a uniform standard by
which courts can determine if a passenger is "embarking or disem-
barking" within the meaning of article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.
This need becomes more acute when it is realized that the same
expression has been retained in the Guatemala Protocol.1
8 3
Unfortunately, the absence of debate or clarification at the adop-
tion of the final text of article 17 leaves confusion as to which
passenger activities fall within the Convention's absolute liability
provision. However, the Warsaw delegates' rejection of the CITEJA
draft makes it clear that the carrier is not to be held liable for all
passenger injuries which take place while a passenger goes about
various activities in the airport before and after his flight.
It is likely that a majority of the delegates did not envision any of
the "operations of embarking or disembarking" could take place
within an air terminal building. In using that phrase, the delegates
probably had in mind the procedures that prevailed at that time, that is,
walking across a traffic apron and mounting a ladder for embarking
and vice versa for disembarking. Nevertheless, the words chosen did
not freeze the then existing techniques of embarking or disembarking
into the language of the Convention. Today, many of the operations of
embarking and disembarking have been moved inside the air terminal.
With the increasing use of an enclosed jet way ramp or mobile lounge,
a passenger typically moves to and from the aircraft without ever being
on the traffic apron or outdoors. In such circumstances, passage
beyond the structural confines of an air terminal building would have
182. See, e.g., I P. KEENAN, A. LESTER & P. MARTIN, SHAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT
ON AIR LAW 441-42 (3d ed. 1966), wherein it is stated:
"In the course of any of the operations" of embarking or disembarking appear
to envisage a wider period of liability and probably include the time during
which the passenger's movements are under the control of the carrier for the
purposes of embarking and disembarking.
(emphasis in original).
N. MATEESCO MATTE, TRAIT~i DE AiRIEN-AERONAUTIQUE 405 (2d ed. 1964) where, citing
Blumenfeld and the 1961 trial court decision in Macht', [1961] REV. FR. DROIT AERIEN
283 (Trib. gr. inst. de la Seine), Matte states the view that, "the responsibility of the air
company is engaged from the moment the passengers are taken under the guard of the
employees of the airline to be taken to the airplane and until the moment they have been
deposited at the air station of destination."; Wessels, Z. LuFr. R. 216 (1958).
183. See note 141 supra.
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but illusory significance. Exclusion of the operations of "embarking or
disembarking" from airport terminals would render the terms mean-
ingless because a passenger could go directly from the terminal to "on
board the aircraft", and vice versa. Accordingly, it must be concluded
that under some circumstances, the airlines' limited liability under the
Warsaw Convention can attach within the air terminal. Furthermore,
each international airport has its own rules and requirements for em-
barking and departing the plane, which are promulgated and enforced
to satisfy the particular needs of that airport. Consequently, a test
based solely on physical location would be unworkable and unrealistic
in modern air travel.
At present there is no absolute test for reasonable determination
whether an accident occurred "in the course any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking". The First, Second, and Third Circuit
Courts all found guidance by examining the actions and location of a
passenger and the degree of control by the airline at the time of injury.
Although this approach is helpful, it leaves to the individual court to
choose the elements for greatest emphasis. Such an unstructured test
will inevitably lead to inconsistent and unequal treatment of passengers
and airlines. With respect to the totality of the circumstances, the
Second and Third Circuit Court opinions reached the correct result, but
on less than wholly sound reasoning, especially with regard to their
analysis of the Warsaw Convention Minutes. On the other hand, the
First Circuit Court decision in Martinez Hernandez appears to be
based on surer footing.
It is suggested herein that courts adopt the following rule to be
used in conjunction with a close analysis of the particular facts in each
case: If a carrier has requested a passenger to board an airplane, and a
passenger acts pursuant to such request, he is embarking within the
meaning of article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. At this point, the air
carrier's limited liability commences. If a passenger has arrived at his
destination and has completed all airline required activities, he has
completed disembarking. At this point, the Convention is no longer
applicable, and a passenger must resort to local law for remedies.
Implementation of this approach would avoid holding the air
carrier liable during that period when a passenger has retained his
freedom of movement. It is further suggested that courts should not
concern themselves with determining whether the cause of an accident
is an "inherent risk" of air transportation. Rather, all injuries, regard-
less of cause, should be similarly analyzed.
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AN INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 17
Until the international legal community clarifies the scope of
article 17, courts may well indulge in judicial treaty making if they do
not approve of the original terms. If the Warsaw Convention is to
maintain its continuing validity in international air travel, passengers
and airlines must be given the assurance that courts will apply one
uniform law.*
Richard David Hendlin
* As this Note goes to press, recent developments include the case of Maugnie v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 45
U.S.L.W. 3807 (Jun. 14, 1977). In Maugnie the plaintiff contracted with Air France for
flight from Los Angeles, California, to Paris, France, where she was to transfer to Swiss
Air for flight to Geneva, Switzerland. When the plaintiff reached Paris, she exited from
the Air France plane and entered Orly Airport terminal to make her Swiss Air connec-
tion. She proceeded from the Air France gate to the main terminal area. In a hallway
between the terminal gate and the center of the terminal, the plaintiff slipped and fell,
incurring injury.
Holding that the plaintiff's injury did not occur in the course of disembarking within
the meaning of article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the holding of the District Court for the Central District of California which
dismissed, with prejudice to plaintiffs complaint.
The Ninth Circuit Court observed that the courts
have not been uniform in construing 'in the course of . . . embarking or
disembarking, as used in article 17, due perhaps to the ambiguous history of
the Convention and the changes in air transportation technology since the
original drafting.
549 F.2d at 1259.
The Maugnie court found that
a rule based solely on location of passengers is not in keeping with modern air
transportation technology and ignores the advent of the mobile boarding
corridors utilized by many modern air terminals.
Id. at 1261.
Therefore, the court preferred a more flexible approach, similar to that taken by
Day and Evangelinos courts, which required "an assessment of the total circumstances
surrounding a passenger's injuries, viewed against the background of the intended
meaning of Article 17." Id. at 1262. The court believed that the Day and Evangelinos
decisions were reasonable, based on the facts involved in those cases. Nevertheless, it
found that the plaintiff's claim did not come within the scope of the Warsaw Convention
because of her location when injured and because "she was acting at her own direction
and was no longer under the 'control' of Air France." Id.
Judge Wallace, however, concurring only in the result, believes that the "location-
of-the-passenger test" of MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d, 1402 (1st Cir. 1971), was
"more in keeping with both a fair reading of the language of Article 17 and the Article's
historical derivation." Id. Judge Wallace found "serious flaws" with the tripartite test
adopted in Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. He stated that Day rests upon a "some-
what selective reading" of the Warsaw minutes, which disregards "substantial portions
of the legislative history favoring the location test." Id. at 1263. Further, Judge Wallace
believes that the Day court, by relying on a social theory of compensation designed to
spread the burden of damages to all travelers, injects "policy arguments alien to the
spirit of the Warsaw Convention." He accuses the Day court of "forming the language"
of the Convention such as to constitute a redrafting. Finally, he observes that in light of
the "two-edged sword" nature of the Warsaw Convention, the Day test may have
"perverse and unintended consequences." Id.
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